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Universal simplicity? The alleged simplicity of Universal Credit from 
administrative and claimant perspectives. 
  
Introduction 
Simplicity is a central tenet that has been used to explain and justify the design of 
Universal Credit and is recognised by those inside and outside of government alike as 
a positive feature of the policy. There has been surprising staying power in the idea 
that a positive (or redeeming) feature of Universal Credit is its simplicity.  However, we 
aim to highlight that clarification is needed as to what is meant by simplicity and 
crucially, who the new system will be simple for. Our argument has application both 
for Universal Credit specifically, and more broadly to simplicity as a feature of social 
security policy design.  
In this article we draw on evidence from two empirical qualitative studies. We argue 
that while from a policy design perspective, Universal Credit could appear simple, this 
is challenged by lived experience data that is oriented towards accessing the 
experiences and perspectives of claimants. In fact, rather than eliminating complexity, 
Universal Credit risks shifting it onto the shoulders of claimants themselves. 
The article is divided into three main sections. The first sets out the case made for 
simplicity within Universal Credit, examining policy documents to establish what may 
be meant explicitly and implicitly by the term. The second further explores the meaning 
of simplicity by distinguishing between two forms: administrative and claimant 
simplicity. The third presents empirical findings to consider simplicity from the 
perspective of claimants in some specific areas. 
The introduction of Universal Credit – simplicity as a central tenet 
Claims of simplicity have been crucial to the design, development and advocacy of 
Universal Credit and can be seen in government and policy documents as well as in 
the words of those tasked with its ongoing implementation. This section will examine 
the origin of these claims and their meaning. 
The recognition of the complexity of the current system and a desire to simplify it 
predates the introduction of Universal Credit. In 2007, the Work and Pensions 
Committee identified a need for radical reform of the UK benefits system and what 
they called its “dysfunctional complexity”, concluding that “simplification should be a 
key priority for the DWP” (Work and Pensions Committee, 2007, 5). One idea put 
forward was the creation of “a single working age benefit” (Work and Pensions 
Committee, 2007, 7). 
This idea was extensively developed in work by the think tank the Centre for Social 
Justice and set out in their report ‘dynamic benefits, towards welfare that works’ 
(2009). In it, they identify three main failings of the benefits system of the time: it 
disincentivised work through high withdrawal rates, it penalised desirable behaviour 
through interacting benefit rules and it was very complex, leading to high costs of 
delivery and “reinforcing dependency” (2009, 17). The proposed solutions in response 
to these failings were related to behavioural change and involved a conviction that 
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human behaviour could be understood and influenced through income gains and 
penalties, particularly to incentivise paid work (Wright, 2012, 322), to adopt “desirable 
behaviour” such as marriage and home ownership and to ultimately move away from 
benefit receipt altogether.  
Simplification of the system was seen as a central means to achieving these solutions. 
Within such a complex system, so the argument goes, claimants are baffled into inertia 
and unable to bear the risks of changing their lives in positive ways (taking a job, 
saving money, moving in with a partner, buying a house, etc.). In more immediate 
terms, claimants found difficulty reporting changes of circumstance to multiple 
government agencies and faced the adverse consequences of inaccurate, delayed 
and changeable payments (Centre for Social Justice, 2009; Hills et al, 2006). 
Merging or grouping existing benefits was seen by the Centre for Social Justice as a 
key simplification tool to address the failings they had identified. Namely through the 
introduction of a dual benefit system to replace “the current 51 possible benefits” with 
“two streamlined payments – Universal Work Credit and Universal Life Credit” (2009, 
25). The former would combine Job Seekers Allowance, Income Support, Incapacity 
Benefit/Employment and Support Allowance and the latter Housing Benefit, Council 
Tax Benefit, Disability Living Allowance, Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credits 
(2009, 47). This would mean bringing together benefits with complex existing 
entitlements and administrative structures but which were also devised to cover very 
different contingencies and circumstances. At this stage in its development, the 
persuasive nature of Universal Credit as a solution to complexity was very much 
centred around its ability to take multiple benefits and combine them into one. 
The idea of simplification was carried forward into the current version of Universal 
Credit which brings together six means-tested benefits for people of working age into 
a single monthly payment that is adjusted monthly using real times earnings 
information (RTI) and delivered by a single government agency (DWP). In his 
Foreword to the government white paper of 2010, ‘Universal Credit, Welfare that 
Works’, Ian Duncan Smith stated that “at its heart, Universal Credit is very simple” 
(DWP, 2010) and linked this simplicity to several concrete aims:  
o To make it clear that work pays in order to reduce the risks associated with 
movements into work;  
o to clarify the application process so that people knew what they would be 
entitled to, to improve take-up rates;  
o to respond better to earnings change and avoid issues at the end of the tax 
year (such as happened under Tax Credits);  
o to reduce fraud and error;  
o to provide clarity on the consequences of non-compliance for claimants;  
o and to move people out of poverty. 
 
Simplification remains a central rationale in more recent policy documents. In the 
Foreword to the 2015 update on progress and delivery, ‘Universal Credit at Work’ it 
was reaffirmed that the new benefit was, “changing the dynamics in the system, 
making things simpler, and ensuring work pays” (DWP, 2015, 5). In the ‘Universal 
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Credit Full Business Case Summary’ (DWP, 2018c), ‘simplicity’ is operationalised as 
the main component of ‘non-financial incentives’ that led to claimants choosing to work 
or to work more. ‘Simplicity and transparency’ is identified as one of the five 
foundational ‘policy levers’ of Universal Credit in the government’s Theory of Change 
(DWP, 2017, 81). As aspects of Universal Credit have been refined or reformulated 
throughout the roll-out process, the central notion of simplicity has remained both as 
a stand-alone principle of good policy design and as instrumental to other policy goals.  
In these examples simplicity is constructed as good for both intrinsic and extrinsic 
reasons, driving positive change within the system. In short: 1) a simple system is an 
inherently good system, and 2) a simple system will lead to other policy goals being 
achieved. Simplicity is deployed as shorthand for what is good about Universal Credit, 
and as a central component underpinning almost a decade of continuing welfare 
reform. 
The meaning of simplicity  
Simplicity has a powerful intuitive value. The intrinsic appeal of simplicity as a good 
and desirable aim by policymakers can be thought of as a sort of common sense. 
There has been an assumed consensus that the social security system in particular is 
far too complex (Work and Pensions Committee, 2007). As a result, working-age 
social security policy is formulated in a way that is not specific in defining simplicity, 
and does not distinguish between different types of simplicity and their potentially 
contradictory nature. This is not to suggest that there are not aspects of the legacy 
system that are complex (see for example, Millar, 2003) with negative implications, or 
that it is not possible to identify specifically where complexity and simplicity lie in social 
security design (Harris, 2015, 201-213). Moreover, policymaking often fails to more 
carefully consider and disaggregate what is meant by simplicity as a desirable feature 
of policy design. 
This section will first consider simplicity’s ‘common sense’ nature before developing 
Millar’s (2005) framework with a focus on administrative and claimant simplicity 
(although it forms part of Millar’s framework, simplicity from the perspective of the 
public is not our focus here). 
Simplicity as policy common sense 
We suggest that ‘simplicity’ can be thought about as an example of what can be called 
policymaker common sense. By common sense we mean features of policy design 
that are widely accepted as good or correct without there needing to be an explicit 
explanation as to why this is. Simplicity is constructed as an intuitively and obviously 
good tenet of social security design. Albeit simplicity is also connected with various 
positive outcomes in policy documents, most notably labour market participation, it is 
also presented as an overarching a priori rationale for Universal Credit’s design. The 
architects of Universal Credit characterised complexity as a longstanding problem that 
needed to be addressed (Centre for Social Justice, 2009; DWP, 2010). Exactly what 
is meant by simplicity does not need to be explained further, because there is a shared 
understanding that it is obviously a good thing to aim for. 
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Indeed, simplicity has intuitive appeal in academic and third sector spheres as well. A 
common position on Universal Credit by organisations or individuals campaigning for 
reform is that the principles behind the policy are sound and that the issues lie in 
design detail and implementation (Finch et al, 2014; Citizens Advice, 2015).  
For example, the statement “we support the aims and principles of Universal Credit to 
simplify the benefits system” is found in different forms in recent Citizens Advice policy 
documents, which then go on to discuss design and implementation (Citizens Advice 
2017; 2018; 2019, 3). The implication here is that if their design and implementation 
suggestions were accepted, a ‘simple’ system would be achieved. However, rather 
than being a straightforwardly good aim, we argue that simplicity depends on 
perspective. Simplicity as currently construed often elides its multiple possible 
meanings, offering a neutral language and point of agreement that facilitates 
discussion between third sector actors and government, but which can inadvertently 
fail to acknowledge claimants’ perspectives.   
 
This predilection for simplicity fits with underlying assumptions of policy design. We 
want to suggest that this relates to the enduring prizing and prioritisation of positivist, 
quantifiable forms of evidence in policy design (for further nuance see, Monaghan and 
Ingold, 2019). This relates to ‘hierarchies of evidence’ (Parkhurst, 2017, 29), which 
rest on a (post)positivist epistemological orientation, where methodological 
approaches are ranked by their ability to eliminate ‘bias’. Furthermore, a characteristic 
of a (post)positivist approach is the pursuit of parsimonious explanation (Williams, 
2003). Qualitative approaches with interpretivist underpinnings fall to the bottom, or 
are outside of, such a hierarchy.  
 
Looking to social security policy’s neighbour, tax policy design, simplicity is a well-
established explicit principle. The Mirrlees Review states the intuitive good of simplicity 
in tax design, saying that, “It is often said that a good tax system should be a simple 
one. And surely a simple one is better than a more complex one if it achieves the same 
ends.” (Mirrlees et al, 2011, 42). One also sees this in the centring of quantifiable 
metrics in social security policymaking. Evaluations of Universal Credit do tend to 
combine quantitative and qualitative evidence (see, for example DWP, 2017; DWP, 
2018b), but this is within an overarching logic where the outcomes of interest are 
measures such as increasing hours or earnings (DWP, 2017, 81). An appreciation that 
the social world is messy and incredibly complex, is often more closely allied to 
interpretivist approaches and qualitative evidence. The predominant view would be 
that we should aim to abstract away from this messiness. However, some types of 
evidence and insights are lost in doing so, as we aim to demonstrate in this article. It 
is not instructive to position simplicity as a self-evident good.   
 
As will be shown, complexity in relation to many aspects of Universal Credit is 
unavoidable (Millar, 2005; Royston, 2017), and what is meant by simplicity needs to 
be specified. The ‘legacy’ social security system has developed in part out of attempts 
to provide a safety net, encourage certain behaviours and meet complex needs 
(Spicker, 2017). By aiming to ‘streamline’ or simplify the working-age social security 
system without clearly stating what is meant by simplicity risks either concealing 
complexity (Harris, 2015, 221) or shifting it elsewhere. 
 
To help us structure our understanding about simplicity, we build on the distinctions 
set out by Millar (2005). Millar’s account highlights the importance of defining and 
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distinguishing between types of simplicity according to the perspective of 
administration; applicants; and the wider public. Millar outlines that administrative 
simplicity involves fewer rules and/or fewer benefits; applicant simplicity involves a 
benefit system that is easy to access and understand; and simplicity for the public 
involves clear messages about what social security benefits are for and what the rights 
and responsibilities of claimants are. Millar notes that these different perspectives 
might sometimes be in conflict with one another, and a challenge is to balance and 
prioritise them. In this article, we aim to explore the import of distinguishing between 
claimant and administrative simplicity. By defining simplicity more specifically by 
accounting for perspective, we suggest that a further challenge to policymakers is a 
misapprehension of what constitutes claimant simplicity.  
 
Administrative simplicity  
Much of the simplicity underpinning Universal Credit can be defined as administrative 
simplicity, although it is not explicitly identified as such by policymakers. In turn the 
claim is made that this form of simplicity will be positive for recipients. Universal Credit 
has been designed to create one system rather than multiple systems, something Neil 
Couling, the director general of Universal Credit, has described as: 
“a huge challenge that is only feasible if the rules are kept simple. That has been 
achieved by adopting some core principles into the design of the system to guide 
the creation of simple and clear sub-policies and processes.” (Couling, 2018, E5) 
Within administrative simplicity we can distinguish between administrative 
technologies and systems, and frontline delivery.  
Universal Credit is an attempt to achieve administrative simplicity by bringing together 
six means-tested benefits1 that are currently administered by different local and 
national government departments each with its own rules and administration. For 
example, Job Seekers Allowance is a benefit for people who are available for work, 
Employment and Support Allowance for those who have limited capability for work and 
Working Tax Credits is paid to those who are in work and on a low income. Other 
benefits such as Carers Allowance and Council Tax Support remain outside the 
Universal Credit system.  
A centralised system also allows administrative simplicity to be achieved through 
digital means. Universal Credit is innovative in that the system is linked to the 
Revenue’s real time earnings system (RTI), meaning that entitlement is calculated 
according to live earnings data, and not ‘manually’. Linking and automating the RTI 
system for Universal Credit administration has infamously been hugely complex and 
expensive to set up (NAO, 2018). Universal Credit’s processes are ‘digital by default’; 
for the first time the primary way in which communication takes place between the 
government and claimants is online. Claims are made and sustained using an online 
Universal Credit portal. The aim is to achieve frontline simplicity through further 
automation, which, it is assumed, also achieves simplicity for claimants.  
 
1 Income based Job Seekers Allowance, Income related Employment and Support Allowance, Income 
Support, Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit. 
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As a result of the linkage to the RTI system to assess entitlement, and because of 
normative claims that monthly social security receipt reflects and encourages 
claimants to adapt to ‘the world of work’, Universal Credit is assessed and paid on a 
monthly basis in arrears (DWP, 2019). To receive their initial claim, recipients must 
wait five weeks (with the extra week added for administrative purposes). Further, one 
payment per household is made, as opposed to the legacy social security system 
where a patchwork of payments might be received by different members of a couple 
(DWP, 2019). All of this, in theory, promises a straightforward system that can be 
applied and administered consistently. 
Claimant simplicity 
The administrative view of simplicity set out above dominates policy debate. Claimant 
simplicity might be achieved through administrative simplicity in these accounts. In 
many ways this focus on administrative simplicity is inevitable. The apparatus of 
government scrutiny means that judgements are often on the basis of how money is 
used efficiently or saved (Treasury, 2018), which can be achieved by reforming 
administrative processes. As shown above, there is an emphasis on quantifiable 
outcome measures for the evaluation of Universal Credit. Space is diminished 
whereby the experience of claimants might form a central focus.  
Another perspective is therefore often missing, that of the claimant themselves. What 
we have termed administrative simplicity does not necessarily lead to, or equate with, 
simplicity from the perspective of claimants. The way in which simplicity is currently 
presented does not allow for this sort of nuance or distinction. Might it actually be, for 
example, that greater administrative simplicity leads to less claimant simplicity? We 
suggest that lived experience data is crucial to understand the functioning of policy, 
and in this specific context allows us to disaggregate the meaning and implications of 
so-called simplicity. 
Royston (2017) argues strongly that the complexity of the benefits system is here to 
stay but that claimants should be shielded from this complexity. Using the analogy of 
a complex electricity supply and flicking a light switch, he argues that users of the 
social security system should be able to access it with ease without the need to fully 
understand it. Any simplification, he argues, must come from the “user’s perspective” 
and he sets out a series of questions that simplifications should address. Among these 
is “Does the change make it easier for the claimant to make ‘real world’ decisions?” 
(2017, 343).  
Claimants’ experience of simplicity 
In order to develop Millar’s (2005) distinction between ‘simple to administer’ and 
‘simple for the applicant to access and understand’, we will now look at how specific 
characteristics of Universal Credit, which can be understood as enacting simplicity 
from an administrative perspective, are experienced from the perspective of claimants. 
This claimant experience of simplicity, we argue, is often not fully appreciated in policy 
decision making and discussion. 
This section will therefore draw on our own qualitative evidence to explore and 
illustrate to what extent simplicity is achieved from a claimant perspective. The first 
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sub-section will introduce our work and methods and the subsequent sections will look 
at aspects of administrative simplicity and consider how these relate to simplicity from 
our claimants’ perspectives. We consider some of the ‘headline’ features of Universal 
Credit: first, monthly assessments, second, monthly payments and third, lump sum 
payments. 
Introduction to our work and methods 
The first study was carried out between 2015 and 2018 and comprised qualitative 
interviews with 43 working-age means-tested social security recipients living in 
London. Almost all participants were in receipt of ‘legacy benefits’ that would in time 
be replaced by Universal Credit, and two were in receipt of Universal Credit. 27 of the 
participants were unemployed. Most lived in rented accommodation, and 21 had 
resident children. The focus of the wider study was on how money in the form of social 
security benefits was experienced and used by its recipients. 
The second study was carried out between 2017 and 2019 and involved qualitative 
interviews with means-tested benefit claiming households over a three-four-month 
period. Participants were also asked to fill in income and expenditure diaries. 
Recruitment of a mixed sample of 15 households took place in a small city in the UK. 
All participants were of working age, ten had dependent children and most rented their 
accommodation. Ten had income from earnings and all claimed at least one means-
tested benefit, 13 claimed Universal Credit. The focus of the overall study was the 
experience and management of short -term income change. 
It was deemed fruitful to combine these two sources of qualitative data. There is a 
growing recognition that there is benefit in combining qualitative data sources, in order 
to pursue a fuller picture of phenomena of interest, which can only be accessed 
incrementally when using small scale qualitative approaches. The accounts of our 
participants allow us to work towards an interpretation of the ‘shared typical’ (Mcintosh 
and Wright, 2019, 460). It is not the aim of qualitative research to be generalisable in 
a statistical sense, but we understand the aggregation of these two studies as ‘second 
order construction’, whereby we are specifically interested in commonality and 
complementarity and therefore the ‘bigger picture’ behind the ‘islands of knowledge’ 
of single studies (Wright and Patrick, 2019, 601). Further, the studies are apt to 
combine because they provide coverage of both the legacy and UC systems, while 
both being underpinned by a focus on money management practices.  
There is also an ethical impetus to make as full use as possible of data that participants 
have drawn on various resources (time, energy, emotion, etc) to generate. In addition, 
the use of qualitative data allows us to access micro aspects of how money is used 
and experienced in people’s daily lives, thus allowing us to explore an important but 
often overlooked aspect of social security policy design.  
Ethical approval was obtained from the relevant university ethics committees, 
participants gave informed consent to take part anonymously and pseudonyms will be 
used in this article. 
Both studies were analysed using thematic analysis, carried out using QSR NVivo 
software, and taking a primarily inductive data-driven approach (Boyatzis, 1998). The 
8 
 
specific analysis from this article began from an interpretation of simplicity as 
manifested in policy documents, which is summarised in the preceding sections. This 
led to the identification of aspects of policy design declared to be simple, which we 
then in turn held up against the corresponding thematic codes and themes in our data 
to consider whether the notion of simplicity also captured what was being expressed 
from the perspectives of our participants. We then worked iteratively to compare and 
incorporate the two studies, which led to us developing and refining our understanding 
of simplicity as defined by perspective.    
In the findings section below we present cases from our data that best illuminate this 
tension between administrative and claimant simplicity, and also that illustrate findings 
that were patterned across the data (i.e. not extreme or outlier cases).  
Monthly assessment 
Monthly assessment in arrears is a defining characteristic of Universal Credit and its 
simplified administrative processes using Real Time Information (RTI).  From the initial 
claim date, a monthly assessment period is fixed in which earnings, other income and 
circumstances are assessed. For example, if a claim is made on 20th January, a 
monthly assessment period will be set from 20th January to 19th February and is 
followed by a seven day period to process payments (DWP, 2019).  This means a five-
week wait is built into the system with a rigid assessment period. Both of these design 
features can provide challenges for claimants. 
While inseparable from the design features achieving administrative simplicity, there 
is increasing evidence that waiting five weeks for a first payment can cause severe 
hardship (The Trussell Trust, 2019). Within study two, the initial waiting period was 
experienced by participants as a period of income inadequacy which required the 
borrowing of money from different sources if available, or going without. Those moving 
from full-time monthly paid employment fared better, as did those with secure 
relational networks, but all were addressing a lack of income (see also Pemberton et 
al, 2017). Here, administrative simplicity comes at the expense of claimants’ financial 
security. 
The fixed nature of the monthly assessment period also poses challenges to 
claimants, making the date on which a change happens or is reported to have 
happened vital to how much Universal Credit is paid. For example, if a change is 
reported just before an assessment period ends, it is taken into account in the following 
month’s pay, if it is reported after then an increase or decrease in payment won’t occur 
until the month after, with no backdating (Tucker and Norris, 2018). The government 
has acknowledged that there may also be issues for people who are paid more 
frequently than monthly who may receive more than one month’s worth of pay packets 
in an assessment period2  and has provided a guidance document so that claimants 
can work out when they will be over or under paid Universal Credit as a result of this 
feature (DWP, 2018a, see Figure 1). The advice constructs the onus as being on the 
claimant to deal with fluctuations of income. 
 




<Insert Figure 1 here> 
The claimant experience of monthly assessments in study two partly depended on the 
stability and payment frequency of income. For those who experienced change, the 
monthly assessment period was experienced as inflexible and financially destabilising 
which again required effort to pursue and establish other forms of security to 
compensate. One participant, Sue, lived in a housing association rented flat with her 
partner and two children. During the four-month research period, she was on maternity 
leave from a part-time clerical job and received her maternity pay on the same date 
each month. Sue explained how she experienced their monthly assessment period, 
saying: 
“Our assessment period was from 30th November to 29th December. I get paid 
on the last working Thursday of every month so the 30th was a payday for me 
and then I got paid on 28th so they deemed that I got paid £1400 [in one month] 
well nearly £1500 when actually I only got paid £790 so they combined my two 
months wage” 
As a result, this family went without their Universal Credit payment and had to borrow 
money from Sue’s mother over the Christmas period. Here, the assessment structures 
deemed to achieve administrative simplicity can be completely misaligned with the 
income structures as experienced by claimants, for which they then must compensate. 
Monthly payments 
Monthly payments are also an important part of the administrative simplicity of 
Universal Credit. Alongside an attempt to mirror monthly paid work there are 
administrative simplification advantages to a monthly payment schedule, which stem 
from the Real Time Information system (RTI). However, around 50 per cent of those 
on the lowest incomes are paid weekly (DWP, 2011) and ‘legacy benefits’ are received 
weekly, two-weekly or four weekly.3 How simple will monthly payments be for people 
who are used to other patterns of income from work and social security benefits and 
who have developed corresponding budgeting processes? In both studies, the 
organisation of money within households most often revolved around a short-term 
system of days and weeks. 
In study two, monthly payments were experienced differently depending on the receipt 
of other income and previous experience of monthly receipt. Monthly payments could 
fit well with monthly bills and for those used to monthly wages, but others found the 
move from weekly, two weekly and four weekly pay under the legacy system to 
monthly pay a challenge. One participant, Katy, who lived in a flat rented from a local 
housing association with her two children, refers to the long period in which she had 
received weekly money: 
“Nearly half my life, you know getting paid weekly and going to monthly it was 
difficult, and they don’t give you any help like, apparently there is some kind of 
 
3 Claimants can also exercise choice over whether they receive Child Benefit and Tax Credits in 
weekly or four weekly payment cycles.  
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budgeting service that will help you work out how to budget, not once did I get 
offered that.” 
Katy also refers to the solution put forward by the government of budgeting advice but 
says she wasn’t offered it.4 Whether or not behaviour change, such as the adoption of 
monthly budgeting, happens over the long term, this administrative simplicity conflicts 
with Katy’s current and historical experience. Here, administrative simplicity imposes 
a monthly payment pattern on those who had previously received weekly money 
challenging well established money management practices. For Katy, this had 
previously meant shorter periods of going without money or “never having to go long” 
before her next payment. 
In study one, where almost all participants were in receipt of legacy social security 
benefits, the majority of participants spoke about using their money in terms of days 
and weeks. A small number of participants (seven out of 43 participants) were oriented 
towards slightly longer-term timescales, encompassing weeks and months. The 
appeal of operating longer term involved having better oversight of one’s finances, and 
‘knowing what you’ve got to play with’. This minority of participants tended to be in 
receipt of working tax credits, and therefore had slightly higher household incomes 
than those out-of-work (and also had the option to opt to receive tax credits four weekly 
or weekly). For the majority of participants, however, short term timescales were 
instead crucial for successful money management. 
In study one, when asked about their organisation of money, the majority (36 out of 43 
participants) described strategies of short-termism that involved daily and weekly 
management. Three main notions underpinned and explained this short termism. The 
first was the ability to establish a degree of security by managing and planning within 
short-term horizons. Rachel, for example, explained that with her tax credits, “I’ve got 
it [paid] weekly and I know what I’m doing with it”. Sabrina explained that her weekly 
Child Benefit payment was a reassuring source of security, “because I…think, ‘right 
I’ve got that 20 pound, if I needed it for anything’.” The second notion was that short-
termism was a matter of survival. Turner was frank that when you are “budgeting 
pennies”, your financial situation is a “concoction of desperate moves”. For some 
participants, especially those who were currently unemployed, two weeks was too long 
and some described borrowing money from family and friends before their next social 
security payment arrived. The third notion, and a function of the previous two, was that 
money was therefore highly transient. As Kirsten remarked, money “just goes”, it 
“disappears”. 
Study two found similar short-term money management patterns within the sample. 
When asked how frequently they budgeted, weekly budgeting periods were adopted 
by seven households, two-weekly budgeting periods by four households, and monthly 
budgeting periods by four households. Short-termism was linked to attempts to control 
unstable and inadequate income and often corresponded with the short-term receipt 
 
4 Although some participants expressed that budgeting advice was pointless either because they were 
the ones who already knew how best to make the most of their current financial situation, or that the 
notion of budgeting was inappropriate. As Sarah from study one explained, “I say it’s not about 
budgeting because the income is quite small, very, very small”. 
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of income. Conversely, a preference for monthly budgeting corresponded with 
receiving income monthly and the habit of matching it to regular monthly bills. 
Short-termism in the context of means-tested social security receipt can be understood 
as a crucial dynamic and tool for managing one’s income, which is particularly acutely 
pronounced for the payment levels provided by out-of-work benefits (Davis et al, 
2018). Short-termism here is a strategy of achieving a degree of control over one’s 
finances (Daly and Kelly 2015, 48; Shildrick et al, 2012, 169-174). These experiences 
are in direct opposition to the claims of administrative simplicity and related claimant 
simplicity cited in the monthly payment design of Universal Credit.  
Lump-sum payments 
As well as the change in frequency of payments, Universal Credit lumps together 
several previous payments into one and pays it directly to claimants. A claimant of 
legacy benefits for example could have received Housing Benefit paid directly to their 
landlord if they were living in social housing, weekly Child Benefit, two weekly 
Employment and Support Allowance and four-weekly Child Tax Credit and would now, 
under Universal Credit, be paid one sum from one government agency.  
There has been growing recognition that people divide up and ‘earmark’ their monies 
for specific purposes, going against assumptions of standard economic theory 
(Zelizer, 2017; Sykes et al, 2014). Study one found that participants engaged in 
complex earmarking practices to separate out their monies, allocate, and protect 
different amounts for different purposes. The ‘pay days’ of different benefit payments 
acted as crucial organisational markers. Further, different bank accounts or the 
physical separating out of cash was used to enforce distinctions between monies. 
Rohina, for example, described how she used her patchwork of payments across short 
time timescales. Her account demonstrates both how earmarking and distinctions 
between monies allowed her to meet her most pressing outgoings, but also how 
difficult this is given the low level of her income: 
“So basically, every Tuesday I get paid the Child Tax Credit, and that would go 
into my other account, and that’s the only money I use to live on. That’s the only 
money, the rest will go on bills, that is the only cash available to me, but that 
account is always overdrawn, always overdrawn, because it’s not enough. So 
when it comes in, 50 of that goes to cover the overdraft, do you see what I 
mean. So I’m always short. Sometimes all of it goes, and sometimes it’s even 
not enough, do you know what I mean. So that money is shopping money, so 
some, I haven’t done shopping for months. And the kids have sort of said to 
me, “Mum why don’t why don’t we do shopping any more”, I say because we 
have no money. So what I do is I just buy cheap things, like tins and things. 
Like we eat, don’t get me wrong, we eat, I did consider going to the foodbank…. 
So I haven’t done shopping like that for, like I say, at least 6, 7 months. I just 
buy when I need now, because that’s all I can do.” 
Rohina separates out her Child Tax Credit, her ‘Tuesday money’ into another bank 
account, physically sectioning it off in order to designate it as money to cover her living 
costs. Although as she notes, this account is often overdrawn, her strategy is 
systematically undermined and this money does not suffice to do ‘proper’ shopping.  
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Study two highlights the importance of varied pay dates and relational coping 
strategies compromised by the lumping together of payments under Universal Credit. 
Participants relied on informal systems of saving and borrowing by arranging their 
outgoings in relation to the pay dates of friends and family. Robert, who lived alone 
and had multiple health conditions would regularly borrow money from a friend, with 
the understanding that they would get the money back the next week when he received 
his benefits:  
“I’ve got a friend that gets paid next Wednesday and she usually lends me a 
bit of money and then I pay her back when I get my PIPs on the Thursday 
following.” 
This strategy of smoothing low and changeable income was also adopted by other 
participants in studies one and two in different ways such as shopping for a friend just 
after being paid and expecting it back on their pay date. This draws attention to the 
importance of informal networks in coping with low and changeable income. Families 
and friends can provide financial services that are not available from other sources 
and these services depend on differing patterns of receipt between people. 
While a single payment provides administrative simplicity, and might intuitively appear 
to achieve claimant simplicity, it can instead increase the complexity for claimants. For 
those who engage in complicated tasks of dividing money, received from different 
benefits, paid at different times for different purposes in order to successfully manage 
their money, Universal Credit removes these frameworks. Multiple payments can 
represent the least complicated option for claimants, whereas a homogenised lump 
sum introduces an additional money management task for some. Indeed, as study two 
shows, some claimants were working to establish and identify distinctions within their 
Universal Credit payment to create some framework for money management on a low 
income.  
Discussion 
In this article we aim to unpick the claims of simplicity that underpin the design of 
Universal Credit. We suggest that simplicity can be thought of as an example of 
policymaker common sense (‘why would you not want a policy to be simple?’), which 
then precludes discussion of what is meant by simplicity more precisely. In policy 
discussions around Universal Credit, simplicity is posited both as an intrinsic good to 
be pursued in relation to the policy, and also as instrumental to achieving an array of 
other policy outcomes. Harris (2013; 2015) has extensively documented the nature of 
complexity, and relatedly simplicity, in social security design; his focus is on how actors 
are able to navigate administrative structures and the implications of this for the nature 
of the social security system. We complement and extend beyond Harris’ focus, by 
examining social security money as experienced by claimants in their daily lives. 
Using the distinctions suggested by Millar (2005), we consider what is meant by 
simplicity in more detail by distinguishing between administrative and claimant 
simplicity. Crucially, simplicity needs to be defined within a given context and specific 
perspective, and indeed simplicity from one perspective may not translate to simplicity 
from another. We examine this potential disjuncture from the perspective of claimants 
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in terms of Universal Credit’s monthly assessments, monthly payments, and lump sum 
payments. We find that claims of administrative simplicity underpinning these features 
of Universal Credit’s design are often misaligned or in conflict with what constitutes 
simplicity for claimants. There is a risk that overarching claims of simplicity in fact 
create further complexities for claimants to cope with and respond to. Complexity, in 
these instances in relation to managing scarce and unpredictable financial resources, 
is further hidden by the ‘simple’ design of Universal Credit, the onus is placed on 
claimants to cope. 
Our approach highlights the importance of lived experience data when assessing how 
social policies operate in practice. Specifically, simplicity cannot be determined a 
priori, and from only one perspective. The realities of managing money on a low 
income are well documented (see, for example, Daly and Kelly, 2015; Patrick, 2017; 
Green, 2012; Hill et al, 2016; Morduch and Schneider, 2017; Pemberton et al, 2014; 
Shildrick et al, 2012). The findings presented in this article add to this evidence base 
and emphasise that this sort of experiential data must be incorporated into policy 
design if it is going to successfully engage with how people experience money in their 
own lives (practices in the Scottish social security system offer a promising model 
(Scottish Government, 2019)). Pushing against a potential (post)positivist bias in the 
evidence that is seen as legitimate to inform policy making; it is not only what can be 
‘counted’ that ‘counts’.  
In sum, we argue that simplicity from the perspective of claimants for social security 
policy design involves a recognition that this area of policy is incredibly complicated 
because people’s lives are complicated (Hills, 2015). Rather than considering 
complexity as something to be eradicated through administrative changes and 
reforms, a simple system from a claimant perspective is one that accounts for various 
complexities. In terms of the specific areas addressed in this article, this could involve 
giving choice over payment dates of Universal Credit in order that recipients can align 
this with other incomings or outgoings; and allowing claimants to choose to have 
payments separated out both temporally and into multiple ‘pots’ when delivered. As 
can be seen in the accounts of participants presented, the low level of social security 
payments, exacerbated by the initial wait for a first payment, heightens the money 
management challenges that claimants have to deal with. Consideration of how social 
security levels are set and on what basis they are determined adequate is also very 
relevant here. Without alterations such as these, Universal Credit is developing as a 
system whereby heightened responsibility is being placed on claimants to successfully 
manage their money and make ends meet, while at the same time claimants do not 
have control to better ensure that this is possible. We can frame our findings 
concerning simplicity and Universal Credit within broader insights about 
responsibilisation, where “weak and tiny units of one bear choices without resources, 
responsibility without power…. Responsibilised individuals are required to provide for 
themselves in the context of powers and contingencies that radically limit their ability 




By questioning claims of simplicity in the case of Universal Credit, we attempt to open 
up an often taken-for-granted feature of policy design across multiple social and public 
policy contexts. Simplicity is a central tenet of how Universal Credit is designed, 
delivered and discussed. 
A shared ‘policy common sense’ with regards to simplicity has accompanied Universal 
Credit’s roll-out across the UK, from government policy documents to comments from 
individuals and non-governmental organisations. But looking beyond this consensus 
there are important clarifications and distinctions to be made. Most importantly for this 
article, the distinction between administrative and claimant simplicity and our evidence 
that demonstrates that these can conflict. 
When lived experience data is taken into account, broad claims of simplicity are 
challenged and a policymaking process that accounts for real-world implementation is 
possible. Our evidence from two empirical studies shows the hardship and difficulties 
faced by claimants who encounter administrative rigidity while getting by on a low-
income. Their well-honed strategies, including of short-termism and earmarking, are 
altered and challenged by policy features characterised as administrative simplicity; 
claimants have few resources but increased responsibility to cope with these changes. 
Where (and to who) complexity falls in the social security system is a political matter; 
it should be a central design consideration for Universal Credit and other social 
protection schemes. Simplicity of design and implementation is a vital aspect of policy 
discussions, but it must be clear what is meant by simplicity. Administrative simplicity 
must be disaggregated from claimant simplicity. The danger of not doing so is that 
rather than eradicating complexity for claimants, (inevitable) complexities in the social 
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